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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are unquestionably a liquor-loving society.  Alcohol is a 
part of daily life for many Americans; for some it is a refreshing 
beverage, for others a social enabler, and for still others a potent 
drug and perhaps a dangerous addiction.  Alcohol has been and 
continues to be a powerful force, spurring protests and debates and 
giving rise to activist groups throughout history and in modern 
society.  Alcohol occupies a unique position in history as the only 
substance to inspire not one, but two constitutional amendments.1 
Alcohol, whether good or evil, has incited a war that has been 
ongoing since the nation’s beginning.  Its numerous battles have 
been at times more than figurative, resulting in violence and lost or 
destroyed lives.  Other battles have been fought in loftier settings.  
The case of Granholm v. Heald2 represents a turning point in the 
nearly two-century-old battle fought between the courts and the 
legislature over the extent of state power to control the importation 
and distribution of liquor within the states’ borders.3  For nearly 
200 years, Congress has fought to give states complete control over 
liquor regulation only to have their efforts frustrated by the 
Supreme Court at every turn.4  For a number of years following the 
Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification it appeared that states had at 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of alcoholic beverages); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVIII).  Demonstrating the uniqueness of these amendments is 
the fact that there are only two ways an ordinary citizen can violate the 
Constitution.  Gordon Eng, Old Whine in a New Battle: Pragmatic Approaches to 
Balancing the Twenty-First Amendment, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Direct 
Shipping of Wine, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1849, 1849 (2003).  One way is by enslaving 
someone and the other is by “bring[ing] a bottle of wine into a state in violation of 
its alcoholic beverage control laws.”  Id. 
 2. 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). 
 3. See infra Part II.  See generally Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1898-1905 (outlining 
the history of the struggle for control over liquor regulation). 
 4. See generally Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1898-1905. 
2
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last won the war, with the Supreme Court seeming to cede control.  
In recent years, however, the Court has gradually been reclaiming 
the power it had abdicated.  The Granholm decision represents the 
Court’s furthest reach into states’ Twenty-first Amendment power 
since the Amendment’s ratification. 
The popularly termed “wine wars”5 are the newest outgrowth 
of this power struggle,6 stemming from the complaints of wineries 
and oenophiles7 that state laws which ban direct wine shipments 
from out-of-state wineries to in-state consumers are 
unconstitutionally discriminatory.8  The Supreme Court addressed 
this issue in Granholm, ruling that states may not discriminate 
against out-of-state wineries by allowing in-state wineries to ship 
their products directly to customers, while requiring out-of-state 
 
 5. Lisa Lucas, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling the Twenty-First 
Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 899, 902 (2005). 
 6. The wine wars have been brought on by developments in e-commerce as 
well as changes in the wine industry.  See Jason E. Prince, Note, New Wine in Old 
Wineskins: Analyzing State Direct-Shipment Laws in the Context of Federalism, the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1563, 1591-
92 (2004); see also Eng, supra note 1, at 1880 (explaining the factors giving rise to 
the wine wars, such as the development of e-commerce, changes in the structure 
of the wholesale liquor industry, and the rise in number and quality of wineries). 
 7. Merriam-Webster defines oenophile as “a lover or connoisseur of wine.”  
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 806 (10th ed. 1993).  Not only are we 
a liquor-loving society, but more than ever we are a wine-loving society.  The grape 
crop in the United States has more than tripled in the past fifteen years, with wine 
grapes composing two-thirds of that total.  American Wine Society, Wine and 
Grape Education, http://www.americanwinesociety.org/web/wine_facts_ 
figures.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).  Wine consumption has been steadily 
growing since the early 1990s, climbing from 176 million cases of wine consumed 
in 1996 to an unprecedented 232 million cases in 2003.  Id.  The number of small 
wineries producing less than 5000 cases of wine per year is growing rapidly, 
currently standing at over 4000.  Michael Barbaro, Small Wineries May Benefit, 
WASH. POST, May 17, 2005, at A06, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/16/ 
AR2005051601523.html.  However, the number of distributors has decreased and 
small wineries have difficulty finding a distributor that is not too expensive and 
willing to deal with small companies.  Id.  For this reason, direct shipment to 
consumers is an essential part of business for many small wineries. 
 8. Lucas, supra note 5, at 899.  Direct shipment laws currently take many 
forms.  Prince, supra note 6, at 1592.  Some states ban direct shipments of wine 
altogether and even make direct shipment in violation of the laws a felony.  Id.  
Other states place various types of restrictions on direct shipments.  Id.  Some 
“reciprocity” states allow direct shipments only from states that also allow direct 
shipments.  Id.  For details on each state’s current direct shipment laws, see 
WineAmerica, Shipping Law, http://www.wineamerica.org/shipment/law.htm 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2006). 
3
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wineries to utilize commercial distributors.9 
This Case Note begins by summarizing the history of the 
Commerce Clause, the Twenty-first Amendment, and the legal 
battle over the balance between the two provisions.10  It then briefly 
outlines the facts, reasoning, and holding in the two appellate 
court decisions consolidated by the Supreme Court11 and explains 
the majority and dissenting viewpoints in Granholm.12  Next it argues 
that the reasoning employed by the majority defies existing law and 
leads to results most likely never intended by those who ratified the 
Twenty-first Amendment.13  Nevertheless, the result the majority 
imposed may be appropriate for modern society.  This Case Note 
concludes by proposing an alternate line of analysis that must be 
undertaken before straying from well-established precedent.14 
II.  HISTORY 
A.  The Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution vests in Congress 
the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.”15  The 
importance of the Commerce Clause is demonstrated by the fact 
that the problem of regulating commerce was one of the main 
reasons for the meeting of the Constitutional Convention.16  The 
framers thought that regulation of commerce by the federal 
government was necessary to stem competition between states and 
to discourage the “economic Balkanization that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the 
Articles of Confederation.”17 
The Commerce Clause acts not only as a grant of power over 
interstate commerce to Congress, but also as a limitation on state 
power.18  The “dormant” Commerce Clause, as this principle is 
 
 9. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1907. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Part VI. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 16. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1895 (2005). 
 17. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)). 
 18. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 1 (2005). 
4
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termed, is not explicitly stated in the Constitution.19  Rather, it is 
generally considered to be the logical inverse of the plenary grant 
of commerce power to Congress.20  The dormant Commerce Clause 
prohibits states from making laws “designed to benefit in-state 
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”21  It was 
this principle that the Supreme Court used to defeat early attempts 
by states to impose local prohibition, and it is this principle that the 
Court returned to in Granholm to defeat state liquor laws once 
again.22 
B.   Pre-Prohibition Liquor Regulation 
Prompted by the temperance movement, state attempts to 
impose local prohibition began years before federal Prohibition.23  
The Supreme Court established early on that a state may regulate 
the manufacture and sale of liquor within its borders as an exercise 
of its police power.24  The Court, however, was less solicitous of laws 
that prevented liquor manufactured outside a state’s borders from 
entering the state.25  Relying on the dormant Commerce Clause, 
the Court struck down attempts to prohibit the importation of 
alcohol26 and held that liquor produced out-of-state could be 
imported and sold in its original package free from the effects of 
state law.27  After these decisions, states that wanted to be “dry” were 
 
 19. Prince, supra note 6, at 1568. 
 20. Id. at 1568-69. 
 21. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 1 (2005). 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
 23. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1897-98 (2005).  The temperance 
movement’s first victory came in 1851 in Maine, with a law that authorized stiff 
penalties for selling liquor.  JAMES WEST DAVIDSON ET AL., NATION OF NATIONS: A 
NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 408 (3d ed. 1998).  Subsequently, 
other states enacted such laws, but most were either struck down by courts or 
repealed.  Id.  For a complete account of American intemperance, the efforts of 
the temperance movement, and the Prohibition era, see THOMAS R. PEGRAM, 
BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA 1800-1933 (1998). 
 24. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (holding that a law 
forbidding private citizens from manufacturing or selling liquor is a valid exercise 
of the State’s police power and does not infringe the constitutional rights of the 
citizen). 
 25. Prince, supra note 6, at 1574. 
 26. See Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 493 (1888) (striking 
down an Iowa law that prohibited transportation of alcoholic beverages into the 
state as a violation of the Commerce Clause). 
 27. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1890) (holding that police 
power attached only after the foreign goods became “mingled in the common 
mass of property within the state”).  The Court held that the State had no power to 
5
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free to ban liquor—but only liquor that was produced within their 
own borders.28 
Recognizing that these decisions rendered states’ prohibition 
efforts virtually meaningless, Congress responded in 1890 by 
passing the Wilson Act,29 which gave states the authority to regulate 
out-of-state liquor “to the same extent and in the same manner” as 
in-state liquor.30  The Wilson Act overruled the “original package 
doctrine” as applied to alcoholic beverages and prevented out-of-
state liquor from being sold in its original package in violation of 
state law.31 
This Act was meant to remedy the effects of the dormant 
Commerce Clause on state regulation of alcohol and to enable 
states to exclude out-of-state liquor.32  However, the Supreme Court 
construed the Wilson Act in a way that stripped it of virtually any 
power that Congress intended it to have.33  In Scott v. Donald,34 the 
Court struck down a South Carolina statute that provided for a 
state monopoly on liquor importation and sale and prohibited in-
state consumers from ordering out-of-state liquor for their personal 
use.35  The Court stated that the Wilson Act was not meant “to 
 
regulate alcohol so long as it remained in its original package.  Id. 
 28. See Prince, supra note 6, at 1574 (“[E]nterprising individuals could 
circumvent their state’s temperance laws by importing alcohol and then reselling 
it to in-state consumers—they merely needed to refrain from removing the 
liquor’s out-of-state packaging.”). 
 29. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (codified as amended at 27 U.S.C. 
§ 121 (2000)). 
 30. The Act provides: 
All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids 
transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, 
consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State or 
Territory be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State 
or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same 
extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had 
been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt 
therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or 
otherwise. 
27 U.S.C. § 121. 
 31. Prince, supra note 6, at 1574-75.  The Supreme Court upheld the Wilson 
Act’s constitutionality, recognizing that Congress may “‘provide that certain 
designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which 
divests them of that character.’”  Id. at 1575 (quoting In re Raher, 140 U.S. 545, 
562 (1891)). 
 32. Id. at 1574-75. 
 33. See id. at 1575. 
 34. 165 U.S. 58 (1897). 
 35. Id. at 92-93. 
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confer upon any state the power to discriminate injuriously against 
the products of other states in articles whose manufacture and use 
are not forbidden, and which are therefore the subjects of 
legitimate commerce.”36  In Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co.37 and 
Rhodes v. Iowa,38 the Court expanded Scott, upholding the 
constitutional right of consumers under the Commerce Clause to 
import liquor for their own use, regardless of state law, without 
violating the Wilson Act.39  While citizens of dry states could no 
longer circumvent liquor laws by selling imported liquor in its 
original package, dry states were still unable to remain truly dry, 
because citizens were free to import liquor for their own personal 
use.40 
The Supreme Court’s construction of the Wilson Act 
prompted Congress to react quickly to close the “direct-shipment 
loophole.”41  Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act42 in 1913 to 
remedy the situation.43  This Act prohibited “shipment or 
transportation” of any “intoxicating liquor” into any state or 
territory in violation of its laws.44  The Supreme Court upheld the 
 
 36. Id. at 100. 
 37. 170 U.S. 438 (1898). 
 38. 170 U.S. 412 (1898). 
 39. Rhodes narrowed the scope of the Wilson Act by holding that the words 
“upon arrival” in the Act meant that state liquor law applied to alcoholic beverages 
only once they reached their in-state destination.  Id. at 421.  States could only 
regulate liquor once it had been delivered to the consumer.  Granholm v. Heald, 
125 S. Ct. 1885, 1915-16 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Vance relied on the 
holding in Scott, affirming the right of the citizen to import liquor for his own use 
free of “onerous and burdensome” regulations that “so hamper and restrict the 
exercise of the right as to materially interfere with or in effect, prevent its 
enjoyment.”  Vance, 170 U.S. at 453. 
 40. Prince, supra note 6, at 1575. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (codified as amended at 27 
U.S.C. § 122 (2000)). 
 43. Prince, supra note 6, at 1575. 
 44. 27 U.S.C. § 122.  This Act provides in full: 
The shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means 
whatsoever, of any spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or other 
intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State, Territory, or District of 
the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, into any other State, Territory, or District of the 
United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, or from any foreign county into any State, Territory, or District 
of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, which said spirituous, vinous, malted, fermented, or 
other intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to 
be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original 
7
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constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act in James Clark Distilling Co. 
v. Western Maryland Railway Co.,45 holding that it was “enacted 
simply to extend that which was done by the Wilson Act, that is to 
say, its purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of 
interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of 
liquor through such commerce in states contrary to their laws.”46  
This Act functioned to divest alcohol of its character as an article of 
commerce in cases where it was imported into a state in violation of 
that state’s laws; consequently, a ban on direct shipments was no 
longer a violation of the Commerce Clause.47  The Court did not 
get a chance to further construe this Act, since the Eighteenth 
Amendment was ratified two years later and produced a temporary 
cease-fire in the battle over liquor regulation. 
C.  Prohibition 
In January of 1920, the Eighteenth Amendment48 ushered in 
the “noble” but miserably failed “experiment” known as 
Prohibition.49  This Amendment prohibited nationwide the 
“manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, 
the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the 
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for 
beverage purposes,”50 and gave Congress and the states concurrent 
power to enforce its provisions.51  The consequences of the 
Amendment were plentiful, but unfortunately those consequences 
 
package or otherwise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or 
District of the United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
Id. 
 45. 242 U.S. 311 (1917). 
 46. Id. at 324. 
 47. Prince, supra note 6, at 1575-76. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. 
 49. See Marc Aaron Melzer, Comment, A Vintage Conflict Uncorked: The 21st 
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the Fully-Ripened Fight over Interstate Wine and 
Liquor Sales, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 279, 279 n.1 (2004) (noting that the term “the 
noble experiment” was coined by President Herbert Hoover to describe 
Prohibition).  The Eighteenth Amendment “appears to be the legal and political 
odd-man-out.”  Id. at 282.  The previous seventeen amendments deal with 
governmental structure and issues of fundamental rights.  Id.  The Eighteenth 
Amendment is the first time the process of amending the Constitution has been 
used “to address matters as mundane as the manufacturing and sale of a single 
class of products.”  Id. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. 
 51. Id. § 2. 
8
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did not include the teetotalism the reformers desired.52  The “flaws 
of this ‘one-size-fits-all alcohol regulatory regime’”53 even led 
President Harding to admit that the “noble experiment” had 
turned into a “nationwide scandal.”54  The failure of the federal 
government to effectively administer Prohibition “hastened the 
Eighteenth Amendment’s demise” and led to insistence on state 
control upon repeal.55 
D.  The Twenty-First Amendment and the Early Cases 
The Twenty-first Amendment was ratified in 1933, repealing 
Prohibition in Section 156 and prohibiting the “transportation or 
importation” of liquor into a state in violation of its laws, in Section 
2.57  The plain language of this Amendment seems to vest complete 
control over liquor importation in the states—unrestricted by the 
dormant Commerce Clause—and in fact, the early cases 
interpreting the Amendment so held.58  A line of cases beginning 
with State Board of Equalization of California v. Young’s Market Co.59 
interpreted the reach of the Twenty-first Amendment as permitting 
states to impose discriminatory regulations on liquor imports.60  In 
Young’s Market, the Court upheld a $500 importation fee that the 
State imposed on beer, stating that prior to the Twenty-first 
Amendment, this provision would have been an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce.61  The Young’s Market Court 
 
 52. DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 856; Prince, supra note 6, at 1576.  
Consequences of the Eighteenth Amendment did include underfunded and 
understaffed enforcement; illegal undercover taverns (speakeasies)—which, 
unlike pre-Prohibition saloons, welcomed women; rurally-distilled moonshine 
which was commonly of low quality and often caused death or blindness; a reversal 
of the trend toward beer and wine in favor of hard liquor; and a proliferation of 
gangster bootlegging, government corruption, and violence.  DAVIDSON ET AL., 
supra note 23, at 856; Prince, supra note 6, at 1576. 
 53. Prince, supra note 6, at 1576 (quoting Matthew J. Patterson, Note, A 
Brewing Debate: Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws and the Twenty-First Amendment, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 761, 769 (2002)). 
 54. Id. at 1576 (quoting LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE BUREAU OF 
PROHIBITION 46 (1929)). 
 55. Id. at 1576-77. 
 56. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
 57. Id. § 2.  “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or 
Possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, 
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”  Id. 
 58. Prince, supra note 6, at 1582-83. 
 59. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). 
 60. See Prince, supra note 6, at 1582. 
 61. 299 U.S. at 62.  Although this provision was discriminatory, in that it 
9
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explained that “[t]he words used [in the Amendment] are apt to 
confer upon the state the power to forbid all importations which 
do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.”62  The 
Court reasoned that the Twenty-first Amendment would certainly 
allow a state to maintain a monopoly over liquor and forbid 
importation altogether.63  If this is so, then the greater power to 
forbid importation must surely encompass the lesser power to place 
restrictions on imports.64 
Several other cases soon followed, challenging restrictions on 
liquor importation, and the Court continued to uphold the laws 
under the Twenty-first Amendment.  In Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. 
Liquor Control Commission,65 the Court upheld a discriminatory 
statute, stating that “whatever its character, the law is valid” since 
“the right of a state [under the Twenty-first Amendment] to 
prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not 
limited by the commerce clause.”66  The Court continued with this 
line of reasoning for a number of years.67  It was not until 1964 that 
the Court began to limit the states’ Twenty-first Amendment power 
and impose dormant Commerce Clause restrictions on liquor 
regulation once again. 
 
placed a higher burden on out-of-state sellers of beer than in-state sellers, the 
Court explained that even if the State had charged in-state sellers an equal fee to 
transport beer, the statute still would have violated the Commerce Clause before 
the Twenty-first Amendment, because it placed a direct burden on interstate 
commerce.  Id.  The Commerce Clause “confers the right to import merchandise 
free into any state, except as Congress may otherwise provide,” but the Twenty-first 
Amendment “abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating 
liquors.”  Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 63. 
 64. Id.; see also Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). 
 65. 305 U.S. 391 (1939). 
 66. Id. at 394. 
 67. See, e.g., Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 137-38 (“Prior to the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon 
Acts, and the Twenty-first Amendment, the powers of the States over intoxicants 
. . . were limited by the Commerce Clause . . . .  The Twenty-first Amendment 
sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought 
from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause.”); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. 
McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939) (Since the Twenty-first Amendment, “the 
right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not 
limited by the commerce clause”); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 
403 (1938) (“[U]nder the [Twenty-first] [A]mendment, discrimination against 
imported liquor is permissible although it is not an incident of the reasonable 
regulation of the liquor traffic . . . .”). 
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E.  Narrowing Twenty-First Amendment Power 
The Supreme Court first indicated that there may be limits to 
the states’ Twenty-first Amendment power in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon 
Voyage Liquor Corp.68  The Court stated that “[t]o draw a conclusion 
from [prior cases] that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow 
operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of 
intoxicating liquors is concerned would . . . be an absurd 
oversimplification.”69  Hostetter concerned a law attempting to 
exercise control over liquor being sold for delivery and use in 
foreign countries.70  The Court held that since the state’s regulation 
was not aimed at liquor intended for delivery or use within the 
state, the statute was an impermissible intrusion into Congress’s 
exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of interstate commerce.71 
The ruling in Hostetter did not disturb the reasoning 
established in the Young’s Market line of cases.  However, in 1984 
the Supreme Court departed from its well-established precedent 
when it seized upon the idea that the Twenty-first Amendment had 
not repealed the Commerce Clause.72  In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. 
Dias,73 the Court struck down a Hawaii tax exemption for certain 
types of locally produced native liquors.74  The Court held that the 
 
 68. 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
 69. Id. at 331-32.  The Court stated that the Twenty-first Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause are both parts of the same Constitution and must be considered 
in light of one another.  Id. at 332. 
 70. Id. at 333. 
 71. Id. at 333-34. 
 72. Prince, supra note 6, at 1587. 
 73. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).  In Roman mythology, Bacchus (equated with the 
Greek god Dionysus) was the god of the vine and the inventor of wine and the art 
of tending grapes.  J.M. Hunt, Greek Mythology: The Lessor Gods, 
http://www.desy.de/gna/interpedia/greek_myth/lessorgod.html#Dionysus (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2006).  “[Bacchus] has a dual nature.  On the one hand bringing 
joy and divine ecstasy.  On the other, brutal, unthinking rage.  Thus, reflecting 
both sides of wines [sic] nature.”  Id.  The son of Zeus and Semele, [Bacchus] was 
the only god with a mortal parent, and one of the few able to bring the dead from 
the underworld.  Id.  [Bacchus] is associated with wanton behavior, and his 
festivals (the Bacchanalia, celebrated March 16th and 17th) got so out of hand 
that they were banned by the Roman Senate.  Micha F. Lindemans, Bacchus, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA MYTHICA: ROMAN MYTHOLOGY, http://www.pantheon.org/areas/ 
mythology/europe/roman/articles.html (follow “Bacchus” hyperlink) (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2006).  How fitting that a case named after the god of wine should be the 
one to hold that wine should flow more freely! 
 74. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.  In order to encourage the development of the 
Hawaiian liquor industry, the State enacted a law exempting okolehao (brandy 
made from the root of the native ti plant) and pineapple wine from the Hawaiian 
11
Lex: Of Wine and War: The Fall of State Twenty-first Amendment Power a
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
14LEX.DOC 4/5/2006  1:36:08 PM 
1156 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
exemption was a clear violation of the Commerce Clause, “because 
it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in favor of 
local products.”75  The Court held that the statute was an invalid 
exercise of Twenty-first Amendment power and disposed of the 
Young’s Market precedent stating that “the Amendment did not 
entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the 
ambit of the Commerce Clause.”76  The Court then applied a 
balancing test, stating that a discriminatory statute would be 
constitutional only if the “principles underlying the Twenty-first 
Amendment are sufficiently implicated by [the statute] . . . to 
outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be 
offended.”77 
F.   Beyond Bacchus 
The confusion generated by Bacchus’s balancing test is evident 
in the lower court cases decided since the Bacchus decision.  The 
direct shipment question in Granholm was previously addressed by 
six circuit courts, all of which came to widely varying conclusions.  
Four courts have followed the reasoning in Bacchus by applying 
variations of its balancing test and ultimately striking down 
discriminatory statutes.78  Two courts have fallen back on the liberal 
 
liquor tax.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 273.  In making this determination, the Court relied on a “cardinal 
rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence” that a State may not enact a tax which 
discriminates against out-of-state products and provides an advantage to in-state 
products.  Id. at 268. 
 76. Id. at 275. 
 77. Id.  Since the statute was enacted as “mere economic protectionism” and 
was not intended to “combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor 
. . . promote temperance or . . . carry out any other purpose of the Twenty-first 
Amendment,” it was unconstitutional.  Id. at 276.  The “central purpose of the 
[Twenty-first Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor 
industries by erecting barriers to competition.”  Id. 
 78. See Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e conclude 
that the regulations in question are discriminatory in their application to out-of-
state wineries, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and cannot be 
justified as advancing the traditional ‘core concerns’ of the Twenty-first 
Amendment.”), aff’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005); 
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 407 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Texas may not use the 
Twenty-first Amendment as a veil to hide from constitutional scrutiny its parochial 
economic discrimination against out-of-state wineries.”); Beskind v. Easley, 325 
F.3d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 2003) (“North Carolina’s regulatory preference of in-state 
wine manufacturers discriminates against out-of-state wine manufacturers and 
sellers, in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, and . . . the preference is 
‘not supported by any clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment.’” (quoting 
12
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interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment originally espoused 
by the Supreme Court, upholding discriminatory direct-shipment 
statutes as a valid exercise of the State’s plenary power to regulate 
liquor importation.79  The two cases consolidated by the Supreme 
Court in Granholm clearly illustrate this split in reasoning. 
III. FACTS OF THE GRANHOLM CASE 
A.  The Three-Tier System and the Challenged Statutes 
As did most states in the years following Prohibition, Michigan 
and New York used their Twenty-first Amendment power to 
establish a three-tier system of alcohol regulation.80  Under this 
system, liquor manufacturers, whether located in or out of state, 
must sell their products to in-state wholesalers; wholesalers may sell 
only to in-state retailers; and retailers may then sell to consumers.81  
As a general rule, this system applies to all liquor sold within a state, 
although some states allow certain exceptions, usually for 
producers of wine.82 
 
Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276)); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir. 
2002) (“Before the State can successfully raise the Twenty-first Amendment as a 
shield, it must show that its statutory scheme is necessary to effectuate the 
proffered core concern [of the Amendment] in a way that justifies treating out-of-
state firms differently from in-state firms . . . .”). 
 79. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005); Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 
F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) (“No longer may the dormant commerce clause be 
read to protect interstate shipments of liquor from regulation.”). 
 80. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 228; Engler, 342 F.3d at 520; Prince, supra note 6, 
at 1591. 
 81. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1893; Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 228; Engler, 342 F.3d 
at 520; Prince, supra note 6, at 1591.  States that adopted this system justified it on 
the grounds that it “ensures the orderly collection of taxes, prevents the vertical 
and horizontal integration of the state alcohol market, and helps fulfill 
temperance goals.”  Prince, supra note 6, at 1591. 
 82. Motivation for discriminatory protection of wine is stronger than for 
other alcoholic beverages because of “[t]he existence in many states of significant 
wine production destined primarily for local consumption” and the tendency of 
wine producers to purchase their materials locally.  Note, Economic Localism in State 
Alcoholic Beverage Laws–-Experience Under the Twenty-First Amendment, 72 HARV. L. REV. 
1145, 1153 (1959).  A major motivation for laws giving advantages to in-state wine 
producers is the desire to protect and encourage local agriculture.  Id.  
Consequently, these laws give advantages where the “ultimate benefits” are likely 
to accrue to local growers.  Id.  “It is notable that most statutes extend preferential 
treatment only to wines produced from agricultural products grown in the state.” 
Id. 
13
Lex: Of Wine and War: The Fall of State Twenty-first Amendment Power a
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
14LEX.DOC 4/5/2006  1:36:08 PM 
1158 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
In Michigan, a license is available for in-state wineries allowing 
them to ship directly to consumers, bypassing two tiers of the three-
tier system.83  This privilege is not available to out-of-state wineries, 
which may ship into the state, but are required to ship to a 
Michigan wholesaler.84  The plaintiffs in Heald v. Engler85 claimed 
that this discriminatory law violated the dormant Commerce Clause 
by giving in-state wineries a competitive advantage over out-of-state 
wineries.86 
Similarly, in New York, licensed wineries may bypass the three-
tier system and ship wine directly to consumers.87  In theory, this 
privilege is fully available to out-of-state wineries.88 All that is 
required to become a licensed New York winery is the 
establishment and maintenance of a physical presence in New 
York.89  Out-of-state wineries may ship to New York customers as 
long as they open a branch in New York.90  However, the plaintiffs 
in Swedenburg v. Kelly91 contended that this law was also 
unconstitutionally discriminatory, thereby disadvantaging out-of-
state wineries by effectively prohibiting direct shipment of wine.92 
B.   Heald v. Engler: The Balancing Approach 
The Sixth Circuit applied the test as set forth in Bacchus and 
held that the Michigan law was unconstitutional and could not be 
characterized as a proper exercise of Twenty-first Amendment 
power.93  The court stated that the law’s “discriminatory character 
 
 83. Engler, 342 F.3d at 520-21. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 86. Id. at 521.  The plaintiffs claimed that in-state wineries could bypass 
wholesalers and retailers and avoid their attendant mark-ups, making in-state 
wines cheaper for consumers in some cases, and allowing the in-state wineries to 
realize a greater profit.  Id. 
 87. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  The Granholm Court described the presence requirement as cost-
prohibitive, evidenced by the fact that “not a single out-of-state winery has availed 
itself of New York’s direct-shipping privilege.”  Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1897.  “For 
most wineries, the expense of establishing a bricks-and-mortar distribution 
operation in 1 State, let alone all 50, is prohibitive.”  Id. 
 93. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 524-26 (6th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub nom. 
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). 
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eliminates the immunity afforded by the Twenty-first 
Amendment.”94  The district court had upheld the statute, relying 
on the Supreme Court’s opinions in the Young’s Market line of 
cases, but the Sixth Circuit held that this reliance was misplaced 
since the Hostetter and Bacchus decisions had signaled a shift in the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning.95  The court of appeals held that the 
correct approach was “to apply the traditional dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis and, if the provisions are unconstitutional under 
the Commerce Clause, to determine whether the state has shown 
that it has no reasonable nondiscriminatory means of advancing 
the ‘core concerns’ of the Twenty-first Amendment.”96 
Applying this test to the Michigan direct-shipment law, the 
court noted that discriminatory statutes “are ‘virtually per se’ 
invalid”97 under the Commerce Clause unless they serve “‘a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’”98  The court found 
that the Michigan statute was clearly facially discriminatory.99  It 
then addressed whether “the regulatory scheme [was] nevertheless 
constitutional because it ‘fall[s] within the core of the State’s power 
under the Twenty-first Amendment,’ having been enacted ‘in the 
interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market 
conditions, and raising revenue.’”100  The court held that it was 
not.101  According to the court, the Michigan Legislature’s stated 
goals of ensuring tax collection and keeping alcohol out of the 
hands of minors were not enough to pass the “strict scrutiny” that 
the court imposes on statutes that discriminate against interstate 
 
 94. Id. at 524 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 344 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 95. Id. at 523-24. 
 96. Id. at 524. 
 97. Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
 98. Id. at 525 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 
(1988)). 
 99. Id.  The discriminatory effect is demonstrated by the fact that Michigan 
wineries have greater access to consumers who desire direct shipment and are able 
to realize a greater profit by bypassing the three-tier system.  Id.  In contrast, out-
of-state wineries are harmed economically by their inability to bypass the system 
and may not be able to gain access to the Michigan market at all.  Id. 
 100. Id. at 525-26 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 
(1990)).  The North Dakota Court proposed these three factors—promoting 
temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue—as the 
“core concerns” underlying the Twenty-first Amendment.  Id. at 523-24. 
 101. Id. at 526. 
15
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commerce.102 
C.   Swedenburg v. Kelly: The Unconditional Grant Approach 
The Second Circuit in Swedenburg reached the opposite result.  
The court held that the balancing approach utilized by the Engler 
court and other courts was “flawed because it has the effect of 
unnecessarily limiting the authority delegated to the states through 
the clear and unambiguous language of section 2.”103  While the 
Sixth Circuit interpreted Hostetter as mandating a balancing test 
between the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment, 
the Swedenburg court read the Hostetter decision as proposing a 
different test.104  According to the Second Circuit, a court should 
consider “the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment’s grant of 
authority to the states to determine whether the challenged statute 
is within the ambit of that authority, such that it is exempted from 
the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause.”105 
The Second Circuit interpreted the recent Supreme Court 
cases not as placing limits on the states’ Twenty-first Amendment 
power, but as upholding limits already there.106  Rather than 
subordinating the Twenty-first Amendment to the Commerce 
Clause when there is a conflict, the court recognized that “under 
section 2, a state may regulate the importation of alcohol for 
distribution and use within its borders, but may not intrude upon 
federal authority to regulate beyond the state’s borders or to 
preserve fundamental rights.”107  The court characterized the 
opinions seeming to limit Twenty-first Amendment power as simply 
recognizing that the Commerce Clause still applies to liquor 
outside of the powers granted to the states.108  The court upheld 
 
 102. Id. at 527. 
 103. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. 
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.; see Patterson, supra note 53, at 780 (“The sole ‘question is whether the 
provision in this case is an exercise of a power expressly conferred upon the States 
by the Constitution.’” (quoting Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 359-60 (1987) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting))). 
 106. See Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 233. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 236; see also Patterson, supra note 53, at 774 (“[P]roponents of the 
unconditional grant theory have never argued that the Twenty-first Amendment 
operates to completely divest Congress of the power to regulate alcohol.  Rather, 
they have argued that the Twenty-first Amendment operates to repeal the 
Commerce Clause as it pertains to state laws regulating the importation and 
16
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New York’s direct shipment law as being within the scope of 
authority granted to the states by the Twenty-first Amendment.109 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.   The Majority—Finally Finding a Balance? 
The Supreme Court in Granholm sided with the Sixth Circuit, 
maintaining its Bacchus stance that a balancing approach is 
required for statutes that discriminate against out-of-state liquor in 
violation of the Commerce Clause.110  The Court laid out the facts 
of the cases and commented on the obviously discriminatory 
character of both the Michigan and New York laws.111  It then 
explained that the States’ position, that their statutes are valid 
under the Twenty-first Amendment despite their discriminatory 
effect, was “inconsistent with our precedents and with the Twenty-
first Amendment’s history.”112  The Court held that the Twenty-first 
Amendment “does not allow states to regulate the direct shipment 
of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers.”113 
The Supreme Court based its holding primarily on its (1) 
interpretation of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and those Acts’ 
effect on the Scott decision, (2) treatment of the Young’s Market line 
of cases, and (3) interpretation and application of the Bacchus 
decision. 
 
distribution of alcohol.”). 
 109. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 239.  Interestingly, although the Swedenburg 
court’s holding does not seem to require this finding, after stating that the statute 
was “within the ambit” of Twenty-first Amendment power, the court went on to 
explain that the statute allows access to the New York market for both in-state and 
out-of-state wine “in a non-discriminatory manner, while targeting valid state 
interests in controlling the importation and transportation of alcohol.”  Id.  
Although “core concerns” do not enter into the court’s calculation, this reference 
could be taken as implying either that the court was somewhat unsure of its 
analysis of the statute or that it would have reached an identical holding had it 
applied a Bacchus balancing test. 
 110. See Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 1897 (2005). 
 111. Id. at 1893-97.  The Michigan law was discriminatory because out-of-state 
wineries were banned completely from shipping to in-state consumers.  Id. at 1896.  
Forcing these wineries to utilize the three-tier system increased costs and for some 
small wineries it had the effect of barring them from the Michigan market if they 
were unable to secure a wholesaler to carry their product.  Id.  The New York 
system accomplished indirectly what the Michigan system accomplished directly.  
Id.; see supra note 92. 
 112. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1897. 
 113. Id. 
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1.   The Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and the Scott Case 
The majority interpreted the Wilson Act as prohibiting 
discrimination “[b]y its own terms,” since the Act allows states to 
regulate imported liquor only “‘to the same extent and in the same 
manner’” as liquor produced in the state.114  The majority 
explained that Scott confirms this understanding of the Act.115  Scott 
involved a challenge to a liquor regulation system that required all 
liquor sales to be “channeled through the state liquor 
commissioner.”116  This statute was discriminatory because it 
required the Commissioner to purchase in-state alcohol whenever 
it was as cheap as out-of-state alcohol, and it limited the state’s 
markup on locally produced wine while imposing no such limit on 
imported wine.117  The Scott Court held that the statute was 
unconstitutional since “the Wilson Act was ‘not intended to confer 
upon any State the power to discriminate injuriously against the 
products of other States in articles whose manufacture and use are 
not forbidden, and which are therefore the subjects of legitimate 
commerce.’”118 
According to the majority, Vance and Rhodes clarified that states 
could not prohibit direct shipments to consumers under the 
Wilson Act.119  The Vance Court “characterized Scott as embodying 
two distinct holdings: first, the South Carolina dispensary law 
‘amount[ed] to an unjust discrimination against liquors, the 
products of other States’”; and second, banning direct shipments to 
consumers was an unconstitutional violation of the Commerce 
Clause.120  The Granholm majority concluded that the second 
holding was implicit in Scott, but Vance and Rhodes later clarified 
and expanded it.121 
The Webb-Kenyon Act was enacted thereafter simply to 
respond to the gap that the Wilson Act left open requiring states to 
allow direct shipments of alcohol to consumers.122  The majority 
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the Webb-Kenyon Act “removed 
 
 114. Id. at 1899 (quoting 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000)). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (quoting Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 100 (1897)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1899-1900 (quoting Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 
422 (1898)). 
 121. Id. at 1900. 
 122. Id. 
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any barrier to discriminatory state liquor regulations,”123 stating that 
the Court in Clark Distilling construed the Webb-Kenyon Act as 
enacted “‘simply to extend that which was done by the Wilson 
Act.’”124  Since the Wilson Act did not allow discriminatory liquor 
regulation, neither did the Webb-Kenyon Act.125 
The Court also rejected the idea that the plain language of the 
Webb-Kenyon Act allows discriminatory legislation, citing 
McCormick & Co. v. Brown126 to support the conclusion that the 
Webb-Kenyon Act, although forbidding shipment or transportation 
in violation of any state law, applies only to “valid” state laws, 
meaning laws that do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.127  
The Court held that the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace Scott’s 
holding that states must regulate in-state and out-of-state liquor on 
equal terms.128 
2.   What Happened to Young’s Market? 
The majority also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the 
Twenty-first Amendment provides states with the authority to enact 
discriminatory statues.129  The majority explained that the history of 
the Amendment “provides strong support for the view that 
[Section] 2 restored to the states the powers they had under the 
Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts,” since the wording of the 
 
 123. Id. at 1901. 
 124. Id. (quoting Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324 
(1917)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. 286 U.S. 131 (1932). 
 127. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1901 (quoting McCormick & Co., 286 U.S. at 141).  
The Court notes that the Webb-Kenyon Act evinced “no clear congressional intent 
to depart from the principle, unexceptional at the time the Act was passed and still 
applicable today . . . that discrimination against out-of-state goods is disfavored.”  
Id. (citing Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981)). 
 128. Id. at 1902. 
[T]he intent of . . . the Webb-Kenyon Act . . . was to take from 
intoxicating liquor the protection of the interstate commerce laws in so 
far as necessary to deny them an advantage over the intoxicating liquors 
produced in the state into which they were brought, yet, [the Act does 
not] show an intent or purpose to so abdicate control over interstate 
commerce as to permit discrimination against the intoxicating liquor 
brought into one state from another. 
Id. (quoting Pac. Fruit & Produce Co. v. Martin, 16 F. Supp. 34, 39-40 (W.D. Wash. 
1936)). 
 129. Id. 
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Amendment closely tracks that of the Acts.130  The Court stated: 
The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow 
States to maintain an effective and uniform system for 
controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, 
importation, and use.  The Amendment did not give 
States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to 
discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they 
had not enjoyed at any earlier time.131 
The Court gave short shrift to Young’s Market and its progeny, 
holding that these cases did not take account of and were 
inconsistent with the history the Court had set forth.132  The Court 
rejected the reasoning in Young’s Market outright in favor of “more 
recent cases . . . [which] confirm that the Twenty-first Amendment 
does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and, in 
particular, does not displace the rule that States may not give a 
discriminatory preference to their own producers.”133 
3.  The Bacchus Balancing Act 
The majority also declined to acquiesce to the plaintiffs’ 
suggestion that Bacchus should be overruled or distinguished, 
stating that Bacchus “forecloses any contention that [Section] 2 of 
the Twenty-first Amendment immunizes discriminatory direct-
shipment laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny.”134 
After determining that the statutes were clearly 
discriminatory135 and that this discrimination was not authorized by 
the Twenty-first Amendment,136 the Court turned to the question 
whether either states’ statute “advance[d] a legitimate local 
purpose that [could not] be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”137  The Court decisively rejected 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1902-03. 
 133. Id. at 1903. 
 134. Id. at 1904.  The Court suggested that Bacchus was not anomalous in its 
recognition that the Twenty-first Amendment does not allow States to enact 
discriminatory regulations.  Id.  The Court noted that Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. 
v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986) and Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 
U.S. 324 (1989) would also be invalidated if Bacchus were overruled since they also 
invalidated state liquor regulations under the Commerce Clause.  Id. 
 135. Id. at 1896-97. 
 136. Id. at 1897. 
 137. Id. at 1905 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 
(1988)). 
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the two justifications advanced by the States attempting to show 
that they could not adequately police out-of-state direct 
shipments.138 
The States first advanced the justification that allowing direct-
shipments of wine from out out-of-state diminished their ability to 
prevent underage drinking.139  The Court found that the States’ 
evidence to support this justification was less than convincing.140  It 
stated that minors are less likely to consume wine than other types 
of liquor, and in any case, are just as likely to order wine from in-
state producers as from out-of-state producers.141  The Court found 
that other non-discriminatory means were available to address this 
problem if indeed it really was a problem.142  The Court also 
summarily dismissed the States’ second concern—the facilitation of 
tax collection—as “insufficient.”143  The Court held that while the 
States’ concern about tax revenue was not “wholly illusory,” the 
States could accomplish these objectives through non-
discriminatory means.144  Since the States had not offered any 
“concrete record evidence” to show that “nondiscriminatory 
alternatives [would] prove unworkable,” the Court held the states’ 
direct-shipment laws to be an unconstitutional violation of the 
Commerce Clause.145 
B.   Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
Justice Thomas in his dissent took issue with each of the points 
addressed by the majority.  He poignantly stated: 
A century ago, this Court repeatedly invalidated, as 
inconsistent with the negative Commerce Clause, state 
 
 138. Id. at 1905-07.  In doing so, the Court relied heavily on a report from the 
Federal Trade Commission, which compiled detailed data on the wine industry 
and barriers to direct shipment.  Id. at 1905; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE 
ANTICOMPETETIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE: WINE (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf. 
 139. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1905-06; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 138, at 4 (noting that 
states that permit direct shipment of out-of-state wines report few problems with 
sales to minors and have found other effective ways to address this concern). 
 142. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.; see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 138, at 4 (noting that states which 
allow direct shipment have reported few problems with tax collection when they 
require permits for wineries who wish to ship to in-state customers). 
 145. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1907. 
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liquor legislation that prevented out-of-state businesses 
from shipping liquor directly to a State’s residents.  The 
Webb-Kenyon Act and the Twenty-first Amendment cut 
off this intrusive review, as their text and history make 
clear and as this Court’s early cases on the Twenty-first 
Amendment recognized.  The Court today seizes back this 
power, based primarily on a historical argument that this 
Court decisively rejected long ago in [Young’s Market].146 
1. The Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts and the Scott Case 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Thomas, 
characterized the Court’s holding as “[s]traying from the Webb-
Kenyon Act’s text,”147 in that the holding required the Court to 
interpret the Webb-Kenyon Act as overruling only Vance and Rhodes 
and leaving Scott intact.148 According to Justice Thomas, “[h]istory 
reveals that the Webb-Kenyon Act overturned not only Vance and 
Rhodes, but also Scott and therefore its ‘nondiscrimination’ 
principle.”149  His dissent noted that when Congress promulgated 
the Wilson Act in an effort to allow states to regulate liquor 
imports, “[r]ather than holding that the Wilson Act meant what it 
said, three decisions of this Court construed the Act to be a virtual 
 
 146. Id. at 1909-10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, 
and Chief Justice Rhenquist also joined in this dissent.  Id. at 1909. 
 147. Id. at 1913.  Justice Thomas gave much attention in his dissent to the 
plain meaning of the Webb-Kenyon Act.  Id. at 1910-13.  He posited that the Act 
“immunizes from negative Commerce Clause review the state liquor laws that the 
Court holds are unconstitutional.”  Id. at 1910.  According to Justice Thomas, the 
Act’s prohibition of liquor importation into a state in violation of “‘[a]ny law of 
such State’ means any law, including a ‘discriminatory’ one.”  Id. at 1911 
(emphasis added).  He disputed the Court’s characterization of the holding in 
Clark Distilling, stating that even though that case upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in 
the context of a non-discriminatory law, the Court’s characterization of the Act in 
that case applies equally to a discriminatory law.  Id. at 1912.  Clark Distilling 
“construed the Webb-Kenyon Act to ‘extend that which was done by the Wilson 
Act’ in that its ‘purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate 
commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such 
commerce in States contrary to their laws.’”  Id. (quoting Clark Distilling Co. v. W. 
Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324 (2005)).  Justice Thomas emphasized that the 
majority’s interpretation of this passage as referring only to nondiscriminatory laws 
was misguided.  Id.  He believed that this passage also applied to the non-
discrimination principle of the Commerce Clause since this “principle flows from 
the ‘immunity characteristic of interstate commerce,’ no less than any other 
negative Commerce Clause doctrine.”  Id. 
 148. Id. at 1913. 
 149. Id. 
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nullity.”150 
Justice Thomas interpreted Scott differently than the majority.  
He explained that the plaintiff was a resident of South Carolina 
who had tried to directly import liquor for his own use, rather than 
purchasing it through the State Commissioner as the monopoly 
system required.151  When the State seized this liquor before he 
received it, he sued for damages and an injunction allowing him to 
import liquor directly for his own use.152  Justice Thomas explained 
that the majority misread Scott when it stated that the main holding 
was that statutes that discriminate against out-of-state liquor are 
unconstitutional.153  According to Thomas, Scott actually held “that 
the state monopoly system unconstitutionally discriminated against 
Donald by allowing him to purchase liquor from in-state stores, but 
not directly from out-of-state interests.”154  Thus, the direct 
shipment question was not only implicit in Scott, it was “squarely at 
issue.”155 
According to Justice Thomas, the Scott Court struck down 
South Carolina’s monopoly system not based on discriminatory 
provisions within the statute, but based on its belief that “a ban on 
direct importation was ‘discrimination’ under the negative 
Commerce Clause.”156  This was the only basis on which the Court 
could have upheld the plaintiff’s award of damages for 
“interference with his ability to import goods directly from outside 
the State.”157  The Scott Court reserved the issue of whether a state 
monopoly system that allowed direct importation was 
constitutional.158 Later, Vance upheld South Carolina’s new 
monopoly system that allowed direct shipments, because it had 
“preserved the constitutional right established in Scott and Rhodes to 
send and receive direct shipments of liquor free of state 
interference.”159 
When Congress enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act shortly 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1914. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1918. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (emphasis added).  Justice Thomas noted that Justice Shiras, who 
authored the Scott opinion, believed that all state monopoly systems were 
unconstitutionally discriminatory.  Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1914. 
 159. Id. at 1917. 
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thereafter, in response to the treatment these cases gave to the 
Wilson Act, it overruled all three cases, not just Vance and Rhodes.160  
Because the direct shipment ban was at the heart of the Scott case 
and the essence of its holding was that a ban on direct shipment 
was unconstitutional discrimination, the Webb-Kenyon Act also 
overruled Scott by closing the direct shipment loophole and 
removing the protections of the Commerce Clause from liquor 
imports.161  Therefore, the Webb-Kenyon Act, Justice Thomas 
remarked, “authorizes the discriminatory state laws before the 
Court today.”162 
2.  Young’s Market Should Be Upheld 
Justice Thomas explained that his reading of the Webb-
Kenyon Act is dispositive of the case, but even under the Twenty-
first Amendment and subsequent case law, the Michigan and New 
York statutes should be upheld.163  He noted that the Twenty-first 
Amendment tracks the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act, but is 
broader in that it encompasses all transportation and importation 
of products destined for in-state use that violates the laws of that 
state.164  According to Justice Thomas, this language “even more 
naturally encompasses discriminatory state laws.”165 
Thomas’s dissent defended the Court’s post-Twenty-first 
Amendment holdings in Young’s Market and its progeny, stating 
that these cases held explicitly that discriminatory laws were 
constitutional under the Twenty-first Amendment.166  Rather than 
failing to consider the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, as 
the majority proposed, the Court in Young’s Market decisively 
rejected “virtually the same historical argument the Court today 
accepts”167 in favor of a holding based on the plain language of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, reasoning that “the text of our 
Constitution is the best guide to its meaning.”168  Justice Thomas 
would have upheld Young’s Market.  He argued that the majority 
gave too little weight to the opinions and practices contemporary to 
 
 160. Id. at 1919. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1920. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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the Amendment.169 
3.  Bacchus Should Be Abandoned 
Justice Thomas did not believe that Bacchus demanded the 
conclusion that the majority reached, but he would have resolved 
any conflict in favor of the Court’s earlier Twenty-first Amendment 
cases.170  He stated that even under Bacchus, the New York and 
Michigan statutes were constitutional.171 
In Bacchus, the Court struck down a Hawaii tax exemption 
because it was “mere economic protectionism,” and the State did 
not justify it under any core concern of the Twenty-first 
Amendment.172  In contrast, Justice Thomas concluded that the 
statutes of Michigan and New York were constitutional because they 
advanced the core concern of allowing states to regulate direct 
shipment of liquor, which was an issue of concern to the drafters of 
the Amendment, as evidenced by the Webb-Kenyon Act’s haste to 
close the direct-shipment loophole.173  Even if one concedes that 
the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize merely 
protectionist liquor legislation, the laws at issue in Granholm did not 
fall under that category.174  The states’ requirements, that out-of-
state liquor pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer, serve 
valid regulatory interests since their “‘presence ensures 
accountability.’”175  The laws simply allow in-state wineries to “act as 
their own wholesalers and retailers in limited circumstances.”176 
The dissent stated that “Bacchus should be overruled, not 
fortified with a textually and historically unjustified 
‘nondiscrimination against products’ test.”177  Although the Twenty-
first Amendment did not “repeal” the Commerce Clause as it 
relates to liquor, “that does not justify Bacchus’ narrowing of the 
Twenty-first Amendment to its ‘core concerns.’”178 
 
 169. Id. at 1921. 
 170. Id. at 1924. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 1924-25. 
 175. Id. at 1925 (quoting Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 
2004), rev’d sub nom. Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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C.  Justice Stevens’s Dissent 
Justice Stevens’s dissent had a different focus.  He argued that 
the Court should give deference to the judges who authored the 
Young’s Market line of opinions, which broadly interpreted the 
States’ power under the Twenty-first Amendment, since they “lived 
through the debates that led to the ratification of [the Eighteenth 
and Twenty-first Amendments].”179  He stated that at the time the 
Amendment was ratified, the idea that 
discriminatory state laws violated the unwritten 
prohibition against balkanizing the American economy—
while persuasive in contemporary times when alcohol is 
viewed as an ordinary article of commerce—would have 
seemed strange indeed to the millions of Americans who 
condemned the use of the “demon rum” in the 1920’s and 
1930’s.  Indeed, they expressly authorized the 
“balkanization” that today’s decision condemns.180 
While many Americans today view alcohol as “an ordinary 
article of commerce,” this was not the dominant view in the times 
that produced Prohibition and its subsequent repeal in favor of 
state control.181 According to Justice Stevens’s “understanding (and 
recollection) of the historical context” of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, it should be “broadly and colloquially interpreted” as 
the people who ratified it intended.182 
V.  ANALYSIS 
In 2004, one ambitious “wine guru” predicted the “total 
collapse” of the three-tier system within ten years.183  After 
Granholm, this prophesy is even more likely to come to pass.  While 
arguable, the Court’s interpretation of the precedents on which its 
decision rests is not altogether unreasonable; the major flaw in the 
Court’s reasoning is that it completely failed to consider the impact 
 
 179. Id. at 1908 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 1909. 
 181. Id. at 1908. 
 182. Id. at 1909 (quoting Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 141 (1944)).  Justice 
John Paul Stevens was born on April 20, 1920, and he grew up during the era of 
Prohibition and its repeal.  Jerry Goldman, Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Multimedia, 
http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/legal_entity/101/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2006). 
 183. Melzer, supra note 49, at 299 (quoting Robert M. Parker Jr., Parker Predicts 
the Future, FOOD & WINE, Oct. 2004, at 120, available at 
http://www.foodandwine.com/articles/parker-predicts-the-future). 
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of its decision on state liquor laws that have been in place since the 
mid-1930s. 
A.   Implications of the Non-Discrimination Principle 
The Court held categorically that state laws discriminating 
against out-of-state liquor are invalid.184  The three-tier system in 
use in most states, which according to the majority is 
“unquestionably legitimate,”185 requires most liquor to pass through 
in-state wholesalers and retailers.  This means that out-of-state 
retailers and wholesalers are unable to ship liquor to consumers in 
another state.  The majority mentioned that the three-tier system is 
valid under the Twenty-first Amendment; however, these laws 
clearly discriminate against out-of-state interests.186  The 
inconsistency in the Court’s position, as Justice Thomas pointed 
out, is that while striking down laws that discriminate against out-of-
state manufacturers, the Court seemed to approve of laws that 
discriminate against wholesalers and retailers.187  Justice Thomas 
commented that the distinction between discrimination that the 
Court held unconstitutional and that which it held to be valid is 
“difficult to understand.”188  The reason the Court’s position is 
difficult to understand is that it does not make sense. 
The Granholm plaintiffs asserted that a decision invalidating 
laws that ban direct-shipments of out-of-state wine based on their 
discriminatory character would “call into question the 
constitutionality of the three-tier system.”189  In response, the Court 
simply stated that “[t]his does not follow from our holding.”190  The 
Court noted that the “Twenty-first Amendment grants the States 
virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or 
sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution 
 
 184. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905 (“State policies are protected under the 
Twenty-first Amendment when they treat liquor produced out of state the same as 
its domestic equivalent.  The instant cases, in contrast, involve straightforward 
attempts to discriminate in favor of local producers.  The discrimination is 
contrary to the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment.”). 
 185. Id. at 1905 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 
(1990)). 
 186. Id. at 1922 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 1911. 
 188. Id. at 1923. 
 189. Id. at 1904-05 (majority opinion). 
 190. Id. at 1905. 
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system.”191  The Court failed to consider the fact that any restriction 
on liquor imports that is not accompanied by a complete in-state 
ban on liquor sales is inherently discriminatory.  In the same 
breath, the Court both affirmed the nearly unlimited power of the 
states under the Twenty-first Amendment and fashioned a weapon 
by which it may gradually take that power away if it so chooses.192 
B.   Implications of the Commerce Clause Test 
Of course, one may argue that the three-tier system is safe 
under the second prong of the Commerce Clause balancing test—
that it “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”193  
From the text of the opinion, it seems unlikely that any 
discriminatory liquor import law would be upheld under this 
second prong.194  The Court gave no indication as to what types of 
justifications would meet the test.  One may begin with the Bacchus 
“core concerns,” but as Justice Thomas noted, although the Court 
placed much weight on Bacchus, it “[did] not even mention, let 
alone apply, the ‘core concerns’ test that Bacchus established.  The 
Court instead sub silentio cast aside that test, employing otherwise-
applicable negative Commerce Clause scrutiny.”195  In addition, the 
Court dismissed two justifications of Michigan and New York for 
the direct shipment laws that fall under two of the core concerns 
previously proposed.196 
The two main justifications that the States advanced for the 
direct-shipment statutes were “keeping alcohol out of the hands of 
minors and facilitating tax collection.”197  These two justifications 
fall neatly under the categories of “promoting temperance”198 and 
 
 191. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)). 
 192. Id. at 1907. 
 193. Id. at 1905 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 
(1988)). 
 194. See id. at 1907. 
 195. Id. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 196. Bacchus asserted promotion of temperance as one of the possible 
purposes of the Twenty-first Amendment and alluded to, but did not specifically 
delineate others.  Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).  North 
Dakota expanded on Bacchus by identifying some of the Amendment’s core 
concerns as “promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and 
raising revenue.”  North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990). 
 197. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1905. 
 198. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432. 
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“raising revenue.”199  Nevertheless, the Court made short work of 
them, stating that although these were valid goals, the States must 
still accomplish them in a non-discriminatory manner.200 
States may defend their three-tier system under any one of the 
proposed core concerns.  However, Granholm has now shown that, 
where discriminatory laws are at issue, two of these core concerns 
are, at best, difficult to establish.  One scholar noted that “the 
three-tier system played a valuable role in the decades immediately 
following the repeal of Prohibition.”201  Its aims were “to collect 
taxes, to reduce the hold organized crime had gained on the liquor 
trade during Prohibition, and to prevent sales of alcohol to 
minors.”202  However, “[a]lthough the system was—and in many 
respects still is—effective, it has not evolved and kept pace with the 
expansion of the market. Consumer choice has, in fact, been 
drastically limited.”203  Some have even called it “an absurdly 
inefficient system that costs the consumer big bucks.”204 
Organized crime is no longer a major problem in the liquor 
industry, and the Court has already indicated that states have non-
discriminatory ways to collect taxes and keep alcohol from minors.  
Given the Court’s focus on the free movement of goods in 
interstate commerce,205 it would not be surprising if the Court 
strikes down the three-tier system at some point in the coming years 
either because it no longer serves a valid purpose under the 
Twenty-first Amendment or because its purposes can be adequately 
served by non-discriminatory means. 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1906. 
 201. Lucas, supra note 5, at 906. 
 202. Id. at 906-07. 
 203. Id. at 907. 
 204. Parker, supra note 183, at 120.  Parker noted that this “narrowly restricted 
approach . . . is coming to a dramatic end—hastened in part by the comparative 
ease of ordering wine over the Internet.”  Id. 
 205. Justice Thomas states in his dissent: 
The Court’s focus on [the effects of the states’ direct shipment laws on 
the wine industry] suggests that it believes that its decision serves this 
Nation well.  I am sure that the judges who repeatedly invalidated state 
liquor legislation, even in the face of clear congressional direction to the 
contrary, thought the same.  The Twenty-first Amendment and the 
Webb-Kenyon Act took those policy choices away from judges and 
returned them to the States.  Whatever the wisdom of that choice, the 
Court does this Nation no service by ignoring the textual commands of 
the Constitution and Acts of Congress. 
Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1927 (citation omitted). 
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C.   Taking a Step Backwards 
So the question remains, what power has the Court left to the 
states under the Twenty-first Amendment, if courts are likely to 
hold all discriminatory laws unconstitutional?  The Court’s decision 
seems to require the view, espoused by some scholars, that the 
Twenty-first Amendment protects only states that wish to be “dry.”206  
However, this view is neither supported by case law nor by the 
practice of the states at the time Prohibition was repealed. 
1.  Post-Prohibition Liquor Laws 
The widespread and largely unquestioned practice of the states 
following the Twenty-first Amendment’s ratification was to enact 
liquor regulations, which were often discriminatory.207  According 
to Justice Thomas, this “confirm[s] that the [Twenty-first] 
Amendment freed the States from negative Commerce Clause 
restraints on discriminatory regulation.”208  He commented that this 
 
 206. The view that the power of the Twenty-first Amendment was intended 
only to protect “dry” states from having to allow direct shipments into the states is 
put forth by several scholars.  Melzer described the two prominent views as the 
“federalist” and “absolutist” views.  Melzer, supra note 49, at 285.  The federalist 
view is that “section two merely protected dry states: that is, states that allowed the 
importation, manufacture, or sale of intoxicating liquor gained no new powers vis-
à-vis the federal government under the amendment.”  Id. at 286.  The absolutist 
view proposed that “the section gave states plenary power to regulate the evils 
associated with intoxicating beverages.”  Id.  Agarwal and Zywicki also posit that 
the Twenty-first Amendment “enabled dry States to remain dry if they so chose, 
but it did not empower wet states to engage in economic warfare against the 
products of other wet States.”  Asheesh Agarwal & Todd Zywicki, The Original 
Meaning of the 21st Amendment, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 137, 138 (2005). 
 207. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1921 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  After the repeal of 
Prohibition, “[s]tates that made liquor legal imposed either state monopoly 
systems, or licensing schemes strictly circumscribing the ability of private interests 
to sell and distribute liquor within state borders.”  Id.  All of these laws were in 
some way discriminatory.  Id.  For example, twenty-one states subjected out-of-state 
alcohol producers to two layers of licensing fees by requiring them to purchase a 
license to sell their products within the state.  Id. at 1922.  Thirteen states charged 
in-state wine manufacturers lower licensing fees.  Id.  One state exempted in-state 
wine producers from licensing entirely.  Id.  Eight states taxed out-of-state liquor at 
a higher rate than in-state liquor.  Id.  Twenty-nine states “exempted exports from 
excise taxes that were applicable to imports.”  Id.  Ten states required a special 
license for “solicitors of out-of-state liquor products.”  Id.  Ten states charged 
increased licensing fees to wholesalers that sold imported liquor.  Id.  Some states 
had “antiretaliation statutes limiting or banning imports from other States that 
themselves discriminated against out-of-state liquor.”  Id. 
 208. Id. at 1921. 
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practice reflects a “lay consensus”209 that discriminatory legislation 
is “within the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment.”210  Rather 
than credit this “lay consensus,” the majority relied on “scattered 
academic and judicial commentary arguing that the Twenty-first 
Amendment did not permit States to enact discriminatory liquor 
legislation.”211  Justice Thomas considered “the uniform practice of 
the States whose people ratified the Twenty-first Amendment” to be 
a more reliable gauge of its meaning than the “confused mishmash 
of elite opinion” that drove the Court’s analysis.212 
2. Case Law Interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment 
Certainly, the failure of the Court to take into account the 
prolific nature of discriminatory legislation, as a guide to the 
intention of those who ratified the Twenty-first Amendment, is 
troubling.  Even more troubling is the Court’s treatment of the 
precedent it used to justify its holding.  The Court not only ignored 
and misapplied controlling precedent, but it also resurrected long-
dead precedent to make the law fit its desired result. 
One of the most troubling aspects of the majority’s decision is 
its treatment of Young’s Market.  Without expressly overruling 
Young’s Market and its progeny, the Court rendered the decisions 
wholly invalid.  The Court did not even stop to consider what 
reasoning might have prompted an entire line of cases to hold—
without one dissenting voice—that the Twenty-first Amendment 
immunized state laws regulating liquor imports completely from 
dormant Commerce Clause review.213  In Granholm, the Court 
adopted an interpretation of the Amendment that the Young’s 
Market Court expressly rejected.214  The Young’s Market Court stated: 
[The plaintiffs] request us to construe the amendment as 
saying, in effect: The state may prohibit the importation of 
 
 209. Id. at 1923. 
 210. Id. at 1922. 
 211. Id. at 1923; see id. at 1903 (majority opinion) (citing case law and scholarly 
works supporting the idea that the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize 
discriminatory liquor legislation). 
 212. Id. at 1923 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens also weighed in on 
this point stating that “the fact that the Twenty-first Amendment was the only 
Amendment in our history to have been ratified by the people in state 
conventions, rather than by state legislatures, provides further reason to give its 
terms their ordinary meaning.”  Id. at 1909 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 213. See supra Part II.D. 
 214. See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 
(1936). 
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intoxicating liquors provided it prohibits the manufacture 
and sale within its boarders [sic]; but if it permits such 
manufacture and sale, it must let imported liquors 
compete with the domestic on equal terms.  To say that, 
would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a 
rewriting of it.215 
The Court’s justification for its dismissive treatment of these 
cases is that it failed to consider the history underlying the Twenty-
first Amendment in reaching its conclusions.216  As Justice Thomas 
pointed out, the Young’s Market Court was presented with an 
argument that the history of the Twenty-first Amendment 
evidenced an intent to omit discriminatory liquor legislation from 
its scope and rejected it outright in favor of an interpretation based 
on the plain language of the Amendment.217  Considering the long 
and tortured history of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Granholm 
Court should have deferred to the interpretations of the Justices 
who had firsthand knowledge of the events.218 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1903. 
 217. Id. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Young’s Market, 299 U.S. at 63-64. 
 218. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1908 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  After the 
Supreme Court in Bacchus commented on the “obscurity of the legislative history” 
of the Twenty-first Amendment, declaring that “[n]o clear consensus concerning 
the meaning of the provision is apparent,” Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 
263, 274 (1984),  the Court grounded its Granholm decision in the history and 
purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment.  See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1902. 
  The Bacchus Court noted that Senator Blaine, the Senate sponsor for the 
Twenty-first Amendment, “appears to have espoused varying interpretations” of 
the Amendment.  468 U.S. at 274.  Senator Blaine’s comments during the 
ratification debates for the Twenty-first Amendment, though inconclusive, are a 
main point of contention in the debate over the Amendment’s language.  
Suggesting a narrow interpretation of the Amendment are the Senator’s words 
that the purpose of the Amendment was “to assure the so-called dry States against 
the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States.”  Aaron Nielson, No More 
‘Cherry-Picking’: The Real History of the 21st Amendment’s § 2, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 281, 287 (2004).  However, Senator Blaine also made other remarks 
indicating that he considered the purpose of the Amendment to be broader.  Id.  
He stated that the purpose of the Amendment was “to restore to the States by 
constitutional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate commerce 
affecting intoxicating liquors.”  Id.  Those who advocate a narrow interpretation of 
the Amendment suggest that the Senator was simply being careless in his word 
choice.  Id.  However, the two statements are not contradictory.  Therefore, there 
is no reason to think that the Senator intended the Twenty-first Amendment to be 
limited to one purpose or the other.  The broad interpretation of the Amendment 
would encompass both statements.  Lucas credits the “rush to ratify” the 
Amendment and the “lack of attention paid to the details and to the potential 
consequences” of the Amendment as key factors leading to the confusion about 
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The Court grounded its decision largely in Bacchus, which on 
its face appears to lend support to the Court’s position.219  The 
Court in that case held that liquor regulations are valid if “‘the 
interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to 
the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the 
regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements 
directly conflict with express federal policies.’”220  But assuming that 
Bacchus reached the right decision,221 it does not require the result 
that the Granholm Court reached.222  The State in Bacchus admitted 
that its purpose in enacting the tax exemption was to encourage 
local industry.223  The Bacchus Court’s holding was based on the fact 
that the admitted purpose of the statute in the case was for 
“economic protectionism.”224  Even under a broad reading of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, it is reasonable to assume that state laws 
that serve no legitimate purpose in combating “the perceived evils 
of an unrestricted traffic in liquor”225 might be invalid.226  However, 
this is not the case in Granholm.  Michigan and New York justified 
 
the meaning of the Amendment.  Lucas, supra note 5, at 919. 
 219. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276 (“The central purpose of the [Twenty-first 
Amendment] was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by 
erecting barriers to competition.”). 
 220. Id. at 275-76 (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 
(1984)). 
 221. This presumption is questionable.  The Bacchus Court largely based its 
decision on Hostetter, stating that this case was evidence that the Twenty-first 
Amendment “did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from 
the ambit of the Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 275.  While it is true that Hostetter 
recognized a limitation on Commerce Clause power, another case decided prior 
to Bacchus makes clear that Hostetter’s holding did not limit states’ Twenty-first 
Amendment power as much as Bacchus assumes.  In North Dakota, the Court states 
that “[i]n [Hostetter], we concluded that the State has no authority to regulate in 
an area or over a transaction that fell outside of its jurisdiction.”  North Dakota v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431 (1990). 
 222. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1924 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the 
Michigan and New York laws are constitutional even under Bacchus). 
 223. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 271. 
 224. Id. at 276.  The Court held that “State laws that constitute mere economic 
protectionism are . . . not entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to 
combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.”  Id.  The Court 
explained that “[h]ere, the State does not seek to justify its tax on the ground that 
it was designed to promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, but instead acknowledges that the purpose was ‘to 
promote a local industry.’”  Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is little 
evidence that purely protectionist tax exemptions like those at issue in Bacchus 
were of any concern to the framers of the [Twenty-first Amendment].”). 
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their laws not as mere economic protectionism, but as means to 
promote the goals of the Twenty-first Amendment.227  In this case, 
the Court should have deferred to the judgment of the legislatures 
in determining the best way for the states to accomplish these 
goals.228 
3.   Back to Scott 
Regardless of the majority’s interpretation of Young’s Market 
and Bacchus, its action in skipping over seventy years of valid 
precedent and reaching back into ancient history to resurrect a 
case that has long been superseded by acts of Congress, a 
constitutional Amendment, and later case law, was completely 
unwarranted. 
The majority conceded that its decision in Granholm takes the 
state of the law back to where it was at the time of the Wilson and 
Webb-Kenyon Acts.229  In fact, the decision takes the state of the law 
farther back than that—all the way back to Scott.  Assuming for the 
sake of argument that the Court does not disturb the three-tier 
system, the Granholm decision still does not remedy the 
discrimination problem.  The majority ruled simply that states may 
not treat in-state and out-of-state liquors differently without 
requiring states to remedy their discriminatory laws in any 
particular way.  Thus, states that currently ban or restrict direct 
shipments from out-of-state have two options.  They may either 
allow all wineries, whether in or out-of-state, to ship directly to 
consumers, or they may ban direct shipments entirely. 
Assuming states decide to allow all direct imports of wine, 
there is no problem with discrimination against out-of-state 
wineries.  However, if a state decides to ban direct shipments 
altogether, the discrimination problem will not be solved.  Those 
small out-of-state wineries that rely on direct shipments and are 
unable to secure in-state distributors to carry their products will still 
be foreclosed from the state’s market.  This outright ban on direct 
 
 227. See id. at 1924 (noting that allowing regulation of direct-shipments of 
liquor was a clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment). 
 228. See Prince, supra note 6, at 1610 (“If direct-shipment laws have outlived 
their usefulness, each state can certainly amend its own laws to accommodate this 
cultural transformation.”). 
 229. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1902 (majority opinion) (stating that there is 
“strong support for the view that § 2 restored to the States the powers they had 
under the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts”). 
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shipment creates as much of a burden on interstate commerce as a 
ban on only out-of-state direct shipments.  Consumers are still not 
able to easily import the products of their choice.  This is the exact 
situation that Scott, Vance, and Rhodes held unconstitutional.230 
The only remedy for this problem, apart from abolishing the 
three-tier system and most other state liquor laws, is to allow all 
direct shipments of wine, and by extension, all direct shipments of 
any type of liquor.  This is the same state of affairs that the Court 
imposed on the states in Scott, Vance, and Rhodes prior to the 
Twenty-first Amendment.  States were allowed to maintain whatever 
sort of liquor distribution system they wanted so long as they 
allowed direct shipment of out-of-state liquor to in-state consumers 
nearly free of any restrictions.231  This was also the state of affairs 
that the Twenty-first Amendment attempted to abolish in 1933.  
Although it does not concede as much, the Court in Granholm has 
given itself the tools to take away nearly every shred of Twenty-first 
Amendment power the states have enjoyed.  It seems the result of 
Granholm is that states now have two choices: remain completely dry 
or be subjected to the unrestricted flow of out-of-state liquor. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
And so, the battle rages on.  The wine wars are destined to 
continue as the states attempt to discern the extent to which the 
Granholm decision has disarmed them.  The Court’s decision has 
created more questions than answers.  It is particularly unclear just 
how much authority the states have after Granholm to regulate 
liquor imports.  Where Young’s Market had previously provided a 
conclusive answer to this question, Granholm has undone all of that 
and provided an avenue by which nearly every regulation on liquor 
importation currently in place may fall victim to the whim of the 
Court. 
The Granholm decision may have reached the correct result for 
today’s society.  However, if that is the case, the Court should have 
employed a different line of analysis in reaching this result.  It was 
the nature of liquor and society’s attitude towards it that led to 
Prohibition and the Twenty-first Amendment in the first place.232  
 
 230. See supra Part II.B. 
 231. See Granholm, 125 S. Ct. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
the state monopoly system was invalid under Scott unless it allowed consumers to 
purchase out-of-state liquor on the same terms as in-state liquor). 
 232. “The people of the United States knew that liquor is a lawlessness unto 
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Likewise, it should be an analysis of the nature of liquor and 
society’s current attitude towards it that determines whether that 
law should be undone. 
The original reason for affording states broad power to 
regulate alcohol, even in violation of Commerce Clause principles, 
is that alcohol is fundamentally different from other articles of 
commerce.  Perhaps this is no longer the case in a nation of fifty 
“wet” states and an age of e-commerce, but we should not be so 
quick to strike down seventy years of alcohol regulation without 
first considering whether it has achieved and is achieving its 
intended purpose.233 
The law of Scott changed in response to dissatisfaction with the 
results it produced.  The Court, in its Granholm decision, takes the 
nation back to the Scott liquor regulation era, and it does so without 
considering the potential consequences.  While the law is 
susceptible to change, the Court should not do so without a full 
analysis of the changes in society that require a departure from 
precedent.  Wine may get better with time, but failed constitutional 
doctrines do not. 
 
itself . . . . They did not leave it to the courts to devise special distortions of the 
general rules as to interstate commerce to curb liquor’s ‘tendency to get out of 
legal bounds.’”  Prince, supra note 6, at 1585 (quoting Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 
U.S. 390, 398-99 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  “It was their unsatisfactory 
experience with that method that resulted in giving liquor an exclusive place in 
constitutional law as a commodity whose transportation is governed by a special 
constitutional provision.”  Id. 
 233. Patterson notes that the focus of the courts in recent evaluations of the 
constitutionality of state liquor laws has been on the intentions of the legislatures 
in passing the laws.  Patterson, supra note 53, at 782.  He states that this focus has 
the result of “strik[ing] down laws that promote temperance on the grounds that 
they were not motivated by concern for temperance.”  Id.  Patterson states: 
The lack of a national market in alcohol, however, is not an accidental 
effect of an erroneous Supreme Court decision, and certainly does not 
contradict longstanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  Rather, an 
implicit intention behind the passage of Section 2 of the Twenty-first 
Amendment was to ensure against the creation of a national market for 
alcohol.  Simply put, a national market for alcohol is incompatible with 
the notion that some states may completely ban alcohol, and nearly 
everyone involved in the debate over the Twenty-first Amendment agrees 
that a state has the authority to completely ban alcohol within its 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 788.  Patterson proposes that a better course of action would be to abandon 
the focus on the purpose of state alcohol regulations and return to a Young’s 
Market analysis under which state liquor laws are exempt from dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny “if they pertain to the importation and distribution of alcohol 
within state territories.”  Id. at 784. 
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